Simulation, Theory and Collapse

Erkenntnis 71 (2):223-232 (2009)
Authors
Bill Wringe
Bilkent University
Abstract
Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get a grip on the mental lives of others we might be able to draw on the fact that we are ourselves subjects of mental states in order to simulate their mental processes. Call these the theory view and the simulation view. In this paper I wish to discuss an argument—which I shall call Collapse—to the effect that if our capacities can be explained in the way that the simulationist supposes then they can also be explained along lines that the advocate of the theory view favours. I am not the first person with simulationist sympathies to have addressed this argument. However, my response is somewhat less concessive than others in the literature: while they attempt to soften its force by attempting to reformulate the simulationist view in a way that evades the conclusion of the argument, I attempt to meet it head on and to show that it does not even succeed in refuting the version of simulationism which it takes as its target.
Keywords Folk Psychology  Simulation Theory  Theory of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-008-9123-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,086
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Explanatory Unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Simulation, Collapse and Humean Motivation.Ian Martin Ravenscroft - 2003 - In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Mind and Language. John Benjamins. pp. 162-174.
Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse.Tony Stone - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):127-173.
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques in the Simulation of Chemical Reaction Mechanisms.Michael Eisenberg - forthcoming - Ai and Simulation: Theory and Applications (Simulation Series Vol. 22, No. 3.). Society for Computer Simulation, San Diego. Ca.
Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability.Jane Heal - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics.Mitchell Aboulafia - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (2):133-147.
Simulation Trouble.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Social Neuroscience 2 (3-4):353–365.
Reclaiming the Ancestors of Simulation Theory.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2009 - History and Theory 48 (1):129-139.
Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation?Justin C. Fisher - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.
Simulation and Irrationality.Elisa Galgut - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
59 ( #116,244 of 2,313,338 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #90,008 of 2,313,338 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature