The perils of dogmatism

In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2007)

Abstract
"Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...) it would pre-empt any role in the diagnosis and treatment of sceptical paradoxes for the kind of notion of entitlement (rational, non-evidential warrant) I have proposed elsewhere [Wright 2004]. But my overarching contention will be that Dogmatism is, generally and locally, too problematic a stance to be helpful in that project.
Keywords Dogmatism
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.

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