The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112 (2009)

Authors
Sarah Wright
University of Georgia
Abstract
If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00133.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Westview Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Unifying the Intellectual Virtues.Christopher Lepock - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.
Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.

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