Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283 (2010)
AbstractFunctionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments
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Citations of this work
Ramsification and Semantic Indeterminacy.Hannes Leitgeb - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-51.
Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
Naturalness, Representation, and the Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
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Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 89:465-466.
Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.