Is Vision for Action Unconscious?

Journal of Philosophy 117 (8):413-433 (2020)
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Abstract

Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is thus wrongly assumed that introspective reports speak to absent phenomenology in the dorsal stream. In light of this, I consider a different conception of consciousness’s relation to agency in terms of access. While theoretical reasons suggest that the inaccessibility of the dorsal stream to conceptual report is evidence that it is unconscious, this position begs important questions. I propose a broader notion of access in respect of the guidance of intentional agency and not, narrowly, conceptual report (Note: this paper contradicts my earlier paper, "The Case for Zombie Agency").

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Wayne Wu
University of Pittsburgh

References found in this work

The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.
Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.

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