In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 441--450 (2010)

Authors
Christian Wüthrich
University of Geneva
Abstract
This paper argues that recent arguments to the effect that the debate between presentism and eternalism lacks any metaphysical substance ultimately fail, although important lessons can be gleaned from them in how to formulate a non-vacuous version of presentism. It suggests that presentism can best be characterized in the context of spacetime theories. The resulting position is an ersatzist version of presentism that admits merely non-present entities as abstracta deprived of physical existence. Ersatzist presentism both escapes the charges of triviality and promises to offer a route to solving the grounding problem which befalls its more traditional cousins.
Keywords Presentism  Eternalism
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References found in this work BETA

On Presentism and Triviality.Thomas M. Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective.Steven Savitt - 2006 - In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime I. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Shedding Light on Time.Craig Callender - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):599.
The Presentist’s Dilemma.Ulrich Meyer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213-225.

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Citations of this work BETA

String Theory, Loop Quantum Gravity and Eternalism.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10:17.
What is Temporal Ontology?Natalja Deng - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):793-807.
On ‘Experiencing Time’: A Response to Simon Prosser.Natalja Deng - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):281-301.

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