Jeremy Wyatt
University of Waikato
Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism.
Keywords Predicates of personal taste  Taste predicates  PPT  Faultless disagreement  Relativism  Contextualism  Absolutism  Disagreement about taste  Asserted content  Semantic minimalism
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2017.1402700
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Minimal Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1649-1670.
How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes?Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

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