Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236 (2013)

Authors
Jeremy Wyatt
University of Waikato
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detail-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what domains are and what work they can do. The viability-related concern is that it’s not clear how a pluralist truth theory could explain the truth-conditions of mixed atomic propositions. To address this concern, truth pluralists should recognize something to which they have not been sufficiently attentive: that some atomic propositions belong to more than one domain. But, recognizing this requires rethinking the relationships between the nature of propositions, their membership in domains, and their truth. I address these issues and propose an understanding of them that is preferable to the best existing account of them, that offered by Michael Lynch
Keywords Domains  Pluralism about truth  Propositions  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0067-5
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Tarski's Theory of Truth.Hartry Field - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):347.
Truth as One and Many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:175-191.
Pluralist Theories of Truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mathematical Platonism Meets Ontological Pluralism?Matteo Plebani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.

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