Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382 (2016)

Authors
Jeremy Wyatt
University of Waikato
Abstract
It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim is to correct several misunderstandings as to what deflationists are after here—including some harboured by deflationists themselves—and to offer an account of the commitments about truth's nature that they ought to undertake. In developing this account, I focus particularly upon the issue of what metaphysics of truth a Horwichian minimalist ought to adopt.
Keywords Truth  Deflationism  Minimalism  Properties  Constitution  Logical properties  Transparent properties  Explanation  Natural properties
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqv085
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):109-131.
What is deflationism about truth?Matti Eklund - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):631-645.
Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic.Gila Sher - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57:337-350.
The Value of Minimalist Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.
From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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