Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):87-98 (2007)
Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA. CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. What the authors see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves be about
|Keywords||Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy and Religion|
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