Philo 14 (1):85-100 (2011)

Schellenberg’s Wisdom to Doubt uses a “meta-evidential condition constraining assent” that I dub MECCA. On MECCA, my total current evidence E may be good evidence for H, yet not justify my believing H, due to meta-evidential considerations giving me reason to doubt whether E is “representative” of the total evidence E* that exists. I argue that considerations of representativeness are implicit in judging that E is good evidence, rendering this description incoherent, and that Schellenberg’s specific meta-evidence has less trumping power than he thinks
Keywords Philosophy and Religion
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Reprint years 2012
ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/Philo20111418
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