Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism

Kant Studien 110 (3):498-511 (2019)
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I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space, I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration. In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change. I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism. Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension.



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Kant-Bibliographie 2019.Margit Ruffing - 2021 - Kant Studien 112 (4):623-660.

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