Abstract

This dissertation defends a claim that, in order for an agent's action to be intentional, it must be brought about by, and in accord with, her judgment that the action is rational. However, weak-willed, or incontinent, actions present a stumbling block to this kind of project of "rational action." For when an agent acts incontinently, she intentionally does what she judges she ought not to do, in the sense that she judges the action to be irrational. Any theory of rational action then has a problem, in that within such a framework, weak-willed actions would appear impossible. I attempt to find a construal of rational action--a characterization of the grounds and requirements of the agent's assessment of her action's rationality--which can maintain a connection between intentional action and practical rationality, and yet still accommodate the occurrence of weakness of will. I examine the recent attempts by R. M. Hare and Donald Davidson to provide such a workable construal. After uncovering difficulties in both Hare's and Davidson's views, I respond by constructing a modified Thomistic account of rational action which avoids those pitfalls. I conclude by noting this account's inclusion of some important changes in our understanding of how intentional action connects to practical rationality, and by projecting further work needed for a more complete explication and defense of this modified Thomistic view.