Explanatory Circles, Induction, and Recursive Structures

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):13-16 (2016)
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Abstract

Lange offers an argument that, according to him, “does not show merely that some proofs by mathematical induction are not explanatory. It shows that none are […]”. The aim here is to present a counterexample to his argument.

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Tom Wysocki
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen