Fake Views—or Why Concepts are Bad Guides to Art’s Ontology

British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (2):193-207 (2018)
Authors
Michel-Antoine Xhignesse
University of British Columbia
Abstract
It is often thought that the boundaries and properties of art-kinds are determined by the things we say and think about them. More recently, this tendency has manifested itself as concept-descriptivism, the view that the reference of art-kind terms is fixed by the ontological properties explicitly or implicitly ascribed to art and art-kinds by competent users of those terms. Competent users are therefore immune from radical error in their ascriptions; the result is that the ontology of art must begin and end with conceptual analysis. Against this tendency towards concept-driven ontology, I offer a trio of objections derived from: the cultural and temporal variability of concepts of art, the systematic tendency, on the part of would-be ontological assessors, to err on the side of familiar categories or, conversely, to exaggerate minor differences between familiar and unfamiliar practices, and the influence artworld precedents exert over expert and folk concepts alike. These considerations, I argue, mandate an epistemic humility that is simply unavailable to the concept-descriptivist.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/aesthj/ayy009
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,003
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Amie Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Mere Exposure to Bad Art.Aaron Meskin, Mark Phelan, Margaret Moore & Matthew Kieran - 2013 - British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (2):139-164.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Legal Concepts as Inferential Nodes and Ontological Categories.Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (3):217-251.
Making Ontology Sensitive.Jocelyn Benoist - 2012 - Continental Philosophy Review 45 (3):411-424.
What Does It Mean for Something to Exist?Lajos L. Brons - 2013 - The Science of Mind 51 (1):53-74.
Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids.Collin Rice - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.
Modal Collapse in Gödel's Ontological Proof.Srećko Kovač - 2012 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 50--323.
The No-Category Ontology.O. Bueno, S. A. Shalkowski & J. Busch - 2015 - The Monist 98 (3):233-245.
Some Aspects of the Ontology of Belief.Lawrence Bruce Friedman - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism.Simon J. Evnine - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):118-140.
Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?John Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.
Probe Into the concept of "Generation" in the Lao Tze.Wei Li - 1999 - Philosophy and Culture 26 (11):1062-1071.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-04-14

Total downloads
17 ( #357,033 of 2,294,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #63,122 of 2,294,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature