In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 35-45 (2000)
By effective thinkers I mean not people who think effectively, but people who understand “how it’s done,” i.e., people not paralyzed by the philosophical problem of epiphenomenalism. I argue that mental causes are not preempted by either neural or narrow content states, and that extrinsically individuated mental states are not out of proportion with their putative effects. I give three examples/models of how an extrinsic cause might be more proportional to an effect than the competition
|Keywords||Epiphenomenalism Habit Mind Thought|
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Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation.Edward T. Cox - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
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