Truth and reflection

Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349 (1985)
Abstract
Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics lie “between” fixed point and stability semantics? In what sense, exactly, are our semantical rules inconsistent? In what sense, if any, does their inconsistency resolve the problem of the paradoxes?The ideals of strength, grounding, and closure together define an intuitively appealing conception of truth. Nothing would be gained by insisting that it was the intuitive conception of truth, and in fact recent developments make me wonder whether such a thing exists. However that may be, until the alternatives are better understood it would be foolish to attempt to decide between them. Truth gives up her secrets slowly and grudgingly, and loves to confound our presumptions
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DOI 10.1007/BF00249368
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Dangerous Reference Graphs and Semantic Paradoxes.Landon Rabern, Brian Rabern & Matthew Macauley - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):727-765.
Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox.JC Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Yablo Without Gödel.Volker Halbach & Shuoying Zhang - forthcoming - Analysis:anw062.
Deflationary Truth and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
Definitions, Consistent and Inconsistent.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):147 - 175.

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