Possible worlds as shifting domains

Erkenntnis 36 (1):83 - 101 (1992)
Abstract
Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible worls. I do so by generalizing Lewis' own idea that restrictions on quantification come and go with the pragmatic wind and relativizing possible worlds as shifting domains of discourse. I then suggest a way to soften the infamous incredulous stare.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00401965
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Theories of Actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.

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Citations of this work BETA
Is Everything A World?Josh Parsons - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.
Actualism or Possibilism?James E. Tomberlin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):263 - 281.
Worlds Enough for Junk.David Sanson - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):1-18.

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