A new argument for evidentialism?

Philosophia 38 (2):399-404 (2010)
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Abstract

In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.

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Author's Profile

Masahiro Yamada
New York University (PhD)

Citations of this work

A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

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References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:115 - 151.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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