Philosophia 38 (2):399-404 (2010)

Authors
Masahiro Yamada
New York University (PhD)
Abstract
In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
Keywords Epistemology  Evidentialism  Doxastic deliberation  Constitutivism  Norm of belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9205-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:115 - 151.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A New Argument for Pragmatism?Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.
Evidentialism and James' Argument From Friendship.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):173-180.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Modest Evidentialism.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-12-21

Total views
187 ( #55,842 of 2,448,288 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,471 of 2,448,288 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes