Philosophia 38 (2):399-404 (2010)
In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
|Keywords||Epistemology Evidentialism Doxastic deliberation Constitutivism Norm of belief|
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References found in this work BETA
No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (226):115 - 151.
Citations of this work BETA
A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry (5):1-9.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
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