Taking aim at the truth

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59 (2012)
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Abstract

One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief formation is a process that takes aim at the truth. Taking aim at the truth is to be understood as causal responsiveness of the processes constituting belief formation to what facilitates achieving true beliefs. The requirement for this responsiveness precludes the possibility of belief formation responding to intentions in a way that would count as forming a belief at will

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Author's Profile

Masahiro Yamada
New York University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.
How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.

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