Dependent and Independent Reasons

Informal Logic 13 (3) (1991)

Abstract
How are dependent (or linked) premises to be distinguished from independent (or convergent) premises? Deductive validity, sometimes proposed as a necessary condition for depende'nce, cannot be, for the premises of both inductive and deductive but invalid arguments can be dependent. The question is really this: When do multiple premises for a certain conclusion fonn one argument for that conclusion and when do they form multiple arguments? Answer: Premises are dependent when the evidence they offer for their conclusion is more than the ordinary sum of their probabilities. Ordinary sums are defined in the paper
Keywords linked premises, convergent premises, induction, deduction
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