R and Relevance Principle Revisited

Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):767-782 (2013)
Abstract
This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others
Keywords R   RM  Relevance logic  (Semi-)relevance principle
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-012-9247-1
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References found in this work BETA
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Protoalgebraic Logics.Janusz Czelakowski - 2001 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Algebraic Kripke-Style Semantics for Relevance Logics.Eunsuk Yang - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):803-826.

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