R and Relevance Principle Revisited

Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):767-782 (2013)

Abstract
This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others
Keywords R   RM  Relevance logic  (Semi-)relevance principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-012-9247-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 48,784
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Algebraic Kripke-Style Semantics for Relevance Logics.Eunsuk Yang - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):803-826.
Infinitary Propositional Relevant Languages with Absurdity.Guillermo Badia - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):663-681.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-02

Total views
84 ( #107,292 of 2,309,306 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #50,883 of 2,309,306 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature