Analysis 73 (2):260-264 (2013)

Muchen Yan
University of Melbourne
Ted A. Warfield reviews the history of epistemology and argues that epistemologists mistakenly take for granted the inference that the failure of closure of some necessary condition on knowledge is sufficient for the failure of epistemic closure. So he concludes that epistemologists should avoid using this inference to explain the failure of epistemic closure. However, I will defend the inference that epistemologists often employ in their discussions. My thesis is that although this inference is invalid, one can still legitimately conclude the failure of epistemic closure from the failure of closure of some necessary condition on knowledge
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ant010
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths.John MacFarlane - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 81--102.

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