Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (1993)
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Abstract |
In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed extension. The main advantage of this revision process is its ability to explain why truth seems in many cases almost redundant, in others substantial, and yet in others paradoxical. Yaub offers a comprehensive defense of the revision theory of truth by developing consistent and adequate formal semantics for languages in which all sorts of problematic sentences can be constructed. Yaqub concludes by introducing a logic of truth that further demonstrates the adequacy of the revision theory.
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Keywords | Truth Liar paradox |
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Call number | BD171.Y37 1993 |
ISBN(s) | 0195083431 9780195083439 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):299-352.
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Instability and Contraction: Méditations Hégéliennes I.Elia Zardini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):155-188.
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