The Janusian Nature of Moral OUGHT

Erkenntnis (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Moral contextualism about “ought”-sentences is a semantic thesis that takes the content of moral “ought” to be a function of contextually relevant parameters. I aim to provide a theory of OUGHT-judgments at the level of thought that supplements the contextualist understanding of moral “ought”-sentences. To this aim, I suggest understanding the concept of ought as an indexical concept for which a phenomenological profile plays an extension-fixing role. Then, I will argue how my suggested view can provide a theory of OUGHT-judgments that is in harmony with moral contextualism.

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Seyed Mohammad Yarandi
University of Toronto at Scarborough

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