Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110-131 (2009)

Authors
David Yates
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better equipped to sustain the distinction than dispositional essentialist accounts. Finally, I argue that the additional evidence needed for strong completeness renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction.
Keywords Causal closure  Downward causation  Emergence  Properties  Causal argument  Physicalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.556.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Causal Closure Principle.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.
Language and Ontological Emergence.J. T. M. Miller - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):105-143.
Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure.Sophie Gibb - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Emergence, Supervenience, and Realization.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51.
Mental Causation in a Physical World.Eric Marcus - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation.Achim Stephan - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):77-93.
On the Causal Completeness of Physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Emerging From the Causal Drain.Richard Corry - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
Emergent Causation.Simon Prosser - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):21-39.
Do Causal Powers Drain Away.Ned Block - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
Mechanisms and Downward Causation.Max Kistler - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
899 ( #4,160 of 2,333,391 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
107 ( #4,420 of 2,333,391 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes