Res Philosophica 98 (2):331-351 (2021)

Authors
Şeyma Yazıcı
Ankara University
Abstract
William L. Rowe poses a dilemma between God’s freedom and essential moral goodness by arguing that God cannot satisfy the arguably accepted condition for libertarian freedom, namely, ability to do otherwise. Accordingly, if God does a morally good action A freely, then there is at least a possible world in which God refrains from doing A and thereby does the morally wrong action. And if God does a morally wrong action in one of the possible worlds, he ceases to be essentially morally perfect. I will argue that Rowe’s conclusion is based on a specific possible world semantics, and we might avoid Rowe’s conclusion with an alternative understanding of modality. In doing so, I will examine the conception of modality proposed by al-Ghaza ̄l ̄ı in which the possibility of a state of affairs does not entail its actuality in at least one possible world.
Keywords William L. Rowe  Divine Freedom  Al-Ghazali  Possible Worlds Semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.11612/resphil.2043
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,864
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and 'Acquisition'.Edward Omar Moad - 2007 - Philosophy East and West 57 (1):1-13.
A Note on Eternity.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2017 - Topoi 36 (4):685-692.
A Note on Eternity.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2017 - Topoi 36 (4):685-692.
Best Feasible Worlds: Divine Freedom and Leibniz’s Lapse.Justin Mooney - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):219-229.
Response To: Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom. [REVIEW]William L. Rowe - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (1):37 - 48.
Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument.Leigh C. Vicens - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
Rowe's Probabilistic Argument From Evil.Richard Otte - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (2):147-171.
Al-Ghazālī and Descartes on Defeating Skepticism.Saja Parvizian - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:133-148.
The Development of Kant's Conception of Divine Freedom.Patrick Kain - forthcoming - In Brandon Look (ed.), Leibniz and Kant. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-04-10

Total views
9 ( #905,541 of 2,433,136 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #73,492 of 2,433,136 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes