Self-consciousness, objectivity, and time

Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):591-611 (2008)
Abstract: This article considers the conceptual connections between self-consciousness, objectivity, and time. The model of conceptual analysis employed examines the necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of expressions in language. In the course of this analysis two distinct options for the explanation of self-consciousness are identified and examined. According to the first (Strawsonian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and other subjects of consciousness; according to the second (Kantian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and the world. The first option is rejected, and a variation of the second option is adopted. According to it, in self-consciousness one is conscious of oneself as a temporally extended point of view (consciousness) over an objective and temporal realm of reality.
Keywords Kant  time  Strawson  self‐consciousness  objectivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00553.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,515
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total downloads
36 ( #169,947 of 2,268,167 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #373,366 of 2,268,167 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature