Self-consciousness, objectivity, and time

Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):591-611 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract: This article considers the conceptual connections between self-consciousness, objectivity, and time. The model of conceptual analysis employed examines the necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of expressions in language. In the course of this analysis two distinct options for the explanation of self-consciousness are identified and examined. According to the first (Strawsonian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and other subjects of consciousness; according to the second (Kantian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and the world. The first option is rejected, and a variation of the second option is adopted. According to it, in self-consciousness one is conscious of oneself as a temporally extended point of view (consciousness) over an objective and temporal realm of reality.
Keywords Kant  time  Strawson  self‐consciousness  objectivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00553.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,564
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.René Descartes - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
35 ( #168,944 of 2,235,796 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #447,087 of 2,235,796 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature