Erkenntnis (forthcoming)

Authors
Andrew Y. Lee
University of Oslo
Abstract
This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology, or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap.
Keywords objective phenomenology  Thomas Nagel  what is it like  structure of experience  structure of consciousness  objective  subjective  phenomenal facts  phenomenal concepts
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
The Logical Structure of the World.Rudolf Carnap - 1967 - Berkeley: University of California Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.
A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism.Serdal Tümkaya - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
Phenomenology, Objectivity, and the Explanatory Gap.Donnchadh Ó Conaill - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):32-50.
Nagel on Subjective and Objective.V. Haksar - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (March):105-21.
Subjective and Objective.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 207-222.
Physicalism and Subjectivity.John Kekes - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-03-07

Total views
84 ( #136,813 of 2,498,723 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
84 ( #8,841 of 2,498,723 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes