Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2933-2959 (2019)

Authors
Peter Fritz
Australian Catholic University
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
Certain passages in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ are often taken to show that non-vacuous sentential operators associated with a certain parameter of sentential truth require a corresponding relativism concerning assertoric contents: namely, their truth values also must vary with that parameter. Thus, for example, the non-vacuity of a temporal sentential operator ‘always’ would require some of its operands to have contents that have different truth values at different times. While making no claims about Kaplan’s intentions, we provide several reconstructions of how such an argument might go, focusing on the case of time and temporal operators as an illustration. What we regard as the most plausible reconstruction of the argument establishes a conclusion similar enough to that attributed to Kaplan. However, the argument overgenerates, leading to absurd consequences. We conclude that we must distinguish assertoric contents from compositional semantic values, and argue that once they are distinguished, the argument fails to establish any substantial conclusions. We also briefly discuss a related argument commonly attributed to Lewis, and a recent variant due to Weber.
Keywords Relativism  Eternalism  Operator arguments  Intensional logic  Modal logic  David Kaplan  David Lewis
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1158-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):519-527.
Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Myth of Occurrence-Based Semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-25.
Propositions and Compositionality.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):526-563.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-11-19

Total views
576 ( #8,684 of 2,331,233 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
81 ( #6,212 of 2,331,233 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes