Cheng Brothers' Neo‐Confucian Virtue Ethics: The Identity of Virtue and Nature

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30 (3‐4):451-467 (2003)
This article attempts to see whether value can be independent of fact. I argue that, in this regard, the two traditional models of ethics, Kant's deontology and Bentham/Mill's utilitarianism are both faulty. In comparison, while contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics does seem more promising, I argue that such a version of virtue ethics is still deficient. The main purpose of this article is to develop an alternative version of virtue ethics, what I call neo-Confucian ontological virtue ethics, drawing on Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi's identification of virtue and nature, which provides a negative answer to our question without committing the 'naturalist fallacy'
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DOI 10.1111/1540-6253.00131
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Stephen C. Angle (2005). Sagely Ease and Moral Perception. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5 (1):31-55.

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