Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 47 (2):301-317 (2020)

Authors
Alfred Archer
Tilburg University
Christopher C. Yorke
Open University (UK)
Abstract
Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According to this idea, the actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously.
Keywords Friedrich Nietzsche  Immanuel Kant  Aristotle  moral generalism  moral exemplarism  moral exceptionalism
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DOI 10.1080/00948705.2020.1788776
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Luck.B. Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
When Artists Fall: Honoring and Admiring the Immoral.Alfred Archer & Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):246-265.
Armstrong Was a Cheat: A Reply to Eric Moore.Jon Pike & Sean Cordell - 2019 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 14 (2):247-263.
Did Armstrong Cheat?Eric Moore - 2017 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11 (4):413-427.

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