Abstract
Wittgenstein’s statement that “if a lion could talk, we would not understand him” seems to be in contradiction with his general understanding of how language works. Some scholars, such as Gary Levvis, have sought to explain Wittgenstein’s point by emphasizing certain features of animals that may prevent us from understanding them. Levvis (1992, 160) suggests that, "If Wittgenstein’s view is correct, then the assignment of rights to animals becomes tricky. I would suggest that before an individual can be assigned rights it is necessary for that individual to be understood.” But in a more traditional reading of Wittgenstein, I focus instead on our practices of attributing meaning to animals' ostensively communicative behavior. In particular, I look at whether we allow expressions of pain to coordinate with our own actions. In cases like this, we sometimes forcefully exclude animals from our communicative practices. The fur industry is an extreme case of this. While furriers might register a fox’s growls, they do not allow foxes to express pain or a desire for freedom. Respecting the moral status of such animals would simultaneously include them in our communicative practices regarding, for example, responses to requests for help, personal space, or basic freedom.