Amending the revisionist model of the Capgras delusion: A further argument for the role of patient experience in delusional belief formation


Authors
Garry Young
University of Melbourne
Abstract
Recent papers on the Capgras delusion have focused on the role played by subpersonal abductive inference in the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. In these accounts, the delusional belief is posited as the first delusion-related event of which the patient is conscious. As a consequence, an explanatory role for anomalous patient experience is denied. The aim of this paper is to challenge this revisionist position and to integrate subpersonal inference within a model of the Capgras delusion which includes a role for experiential content. I argue that the following revisionist claims are problematic: (a) that a fully-formed belief enters consciousness, and (b) that this is the first conscious delusion-related event. Instead, it is my contention that a delusional thought (arrived at through subpersonal abductive inference) and an anomalous experience co-occur in consciousness prior to the formation of the delusional belief. The co-occurrence of thought and anomalous experience overcomes problems with the revisionist position resulting in an account of the Capgras delusion with greater explanatory efficacy.
Keywords Bayes’ theorem  Abductive inference  Anomalous experience  Endorsement and explanationist accounts  Indicative imagination  Face recognition system  Skin conductance response (SCR)
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.26913/50302014.0112.0005
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References found in this work BETA

Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
Abductive Inference and Delusional Belief.Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies & John Sutton - 2010 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1):261-287.
Recreative Minds.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):329-334.

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