Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: an interactionist account of delusional misidentification [Book Review]


Authors
Garry Young
University of Melbourne
Abstract
This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience in accounting for the specificity of the delusional content. The role played by patient phenomenology is examined in light of Ratcliffe’s recent phenomenological account. Similarities and differences are discussed. The paper concludes that a purely phenomenological account is unable to differentiate between non-delusional patient groups, who have what appear to be equivalent phenomenal experiences to patients suffering from delusional misidentification but without the delusional belief, and delusional groups, something the interactionist model is able to do
Keywords Delusional belief  Capgras  Fregoli  Cotard  Familiarity  Estrangement  Phenomenal experience
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9168-9
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References found in this work BETA

Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
Recognizing: The Judgment of Previous Occurrence.George Mandler - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):252-271.
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Sense of Death and Non-Existence in Nihilistic Delusions.Filip Radovic - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):679-699.

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