Bodily knowing : Re-thinking our understanding of procedural knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):37 – 54 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.

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Garry Young
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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