Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):333-349 (2010)
Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Science Developmental Psychology Epistemology Neurosciences Cognitive Psychology Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred From Neuroimaging Data?Russell A. Poldrack - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):59-63.
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
Citations of this work BETA
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.
Intentionality, Morality, and the Incest Taboo in Madagascar.Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
Why We Forgive What Can’T Be Controlled.Justin W. Martin & Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Cognition 147:133-143.
Similar books and articles
Moral Luck in Thomas Hardy's Fiction.Chengping Zhang - 2010 - Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 82-94.
Added to index2010-03-27
Total downloads92 ( #56,858 of 2,177,824 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,245 of 2,177,824 )
How can I increase my downloads?