Pointing and Representing: Three Options

Humana Mente 6 (24) (2013)
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The aim of this paper is to explore the minimal representational requirements for pointing. One year old children are capable of pointing – what does this tell us about their representational capacities? We analyse three options: (1) pointing presupposes non-perceptual representations, (2) pointing does not presuppose any representation at all, (3) pointing presupposes perceptual representations. Rather than fully endorsing any of these three options, the aim of the paper is to explore the advantages and disadvantages of each.



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Author Profiles

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Angelica Kaufmann
Universität Göttingen

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