Spinoza's theory of motivation

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):375–390 (2007)
On the basis of 3p9s and 3p39s of the Ethics, it might seem that, for Spinoza, a judgment about something's goodness or badness is motivationally inert and, moreover, that value judgments essentially reflect an individual's pre-existing motivational states. However, in this paper I show that Spinoza holds that under certain conditions a motivational state results from a value judgment. Spinoza's theory of motivation consists of two accounts of the psychological order of value judgments and motivational states: an account of their order in those in bondage as well as an account of their order in those who are free.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00298.x
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Justin Steinberg (2015). Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):67-87.

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