Truth, correspondence and deflationism

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575 (2009)
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Abstract

The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “ s is true iff p ”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.

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James O. Young
University of Victoria

Citations of this work

Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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