The slingshot argument and the correspondence theory of truth

Acta Analytica 17 (2):121-132 (2002)
The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the fact that P’ every true sentence can be shown to correspond to the same facts as every other true sentence. The claim is that all substitution of logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms takes place salva veritate. I argue that the substitution of coreferring terms in this context need not preserve truth. The slingshot fails to refute the correspondence theory
Keywords Correspondence Theory  Truth  Slingshot  Donald Davidson  Facts
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-002-1008-2
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Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Alonzo Church (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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