Supposition and truth in ockham's mental language

Topoi 16 (1):15-25 (1997)
In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in OckhamÕs mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the same things or not for the same things.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Philosophy of Technology
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Reprint years 2004, 2009
DOI 10.1023/A:1005759617955
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