Dialectica 71 (4):463-488 (2017)

In this paper, I motivate a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions. As an application, I suggest that the account provides a satisfying solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The account is in the spirit of recently developed modal accounts of sets motivated on the basis of the iterative conception of sets.
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12193
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References found in this work BETA

Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
The Potential Hierarchy of Sets.Øystein Linnebo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):205-228.
Reality is Not Structured.Jeremy Goodman - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):43–53.

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How to Build a Thought.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):75-83.

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