A Modal Account of Propositions

Dialectica 71 (4):463-488 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper, I motivate a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions. As an application, I suggest that the account provides a satisfying solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The account is in the spirit of recently developed modal accounts of sets motivated on the basis of the iterative conception of sets.

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Andy Yu
University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

In defense of Countabilism.David Builes & Jessica M. Wilson - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2199-2236.
Russell–Myhill and grounding.Boris Kment - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):49-60.
Modal Expansionism.Alexander Roberts - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1145-1170.
How to Build a Thought.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):75-83.

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References found in this work

The potential hierarchy of sets.Øystein Linnebo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):205-228.
Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
The iterative conception of set.George Boolos - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
Necessary existents.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - In A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, thought, and language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-251.

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