Fool me once: Can indifference vindicate induction?
Episteme 15 (2):202-208 (2018)
Abstract
Roger White (2015) sketches an ingenious new solution to the problem of induction. He argues from the principle of indifference for the conclusion that the world is more likely to be induction- friendly than induction-unfriendly. But there is reason to be skeptical about the proposed indifference-based vindication of induction. It can be shown that, in the crucial test cases White concentrates on, the assumption of indifference renders induction no more accurate than random guessing. After discussing this result, the paper explains why the indifference-based argument seemed so compelling, despite ultimately being unsound.Author Profiles
DOI
10.1017/epi.2017.2
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Citations of this work
The no free lunch theorem: Bad news for (white's account of) the problem of induction.Gerhard Schurz - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):31-45.
Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction.Hsueh Qu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7131-7157.
References found in this work
No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-induction.Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):825-839.