Philosophy Without Belief

Mind 128 (509):109-138 (2019)

Authors
Zach Barnett
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Should we believe our controversial philosophical views? Recently, several authors have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: If we believe our views, we are irrational. If we do not, we are not sincere in holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain sort of ‘insulated’ reasoning – that is, reasoning that involves setting aside certain higher-order worries, such as those provided by disagreement – when we investigate philosophical questions.
Keywords disagreement  epistemology of disagreement  disagreement in philosophy  metaphilosophical skepticism  social epistemology  formal social epistemology  judgment aggregation  conciliationism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzw076
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References found in this work BETA

What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Endorse Conciliationism.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1):1-24.
Publishing Without Belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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