Philosophy Without Belief

Mind 128 (509):109-138 (2019)
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Abstract

Should we believe our controversial philosophical views? Recently, several authors have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: If we believe our views, we are irrational. If we do not, we are not sincere in holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain sort of ‘insulated’ reasoning – that is, reasoning that involves setting aside certain higher-order worries, such as those provided by disagreement – when we investigate philosophical questions.

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Author's Profile

Zach Barnett
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.

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