First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytic philosophy and cognitive science [Book Review]

Authors
Dan Zahavi
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange
Keywords Analytic  Phenomenology  Philosophy  Self-awareness
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DOI 10.1023/A:1015568518276
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Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW]Vittorio Gallese - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.
Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
Eichberg's 'Phenomenology' of Sport: A Phenomenal Confusion.Irena Martínková & Jim Parry - 2013 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 7 (3):331 - 341.

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