Intentionality and the representative theory of perception

Man and World 27 (1):37-47 (1994)
Among the many accomplishments achieved by Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, the outline of an intentional account of perception counts among the most prominent. 1 One of the consequences of this account was a severe criticism of the traditional representative theory of perception, and my aim in the following paper is to present this criticism and some of its ontological implications. 2 Even though Husserl's critique was directed against the positions of thinkers like Locke, Kant, Brentano and Twardowski, it is my contention that his arguments are also valid against modem theories of perception, insofar as they belong to one of the two following versions of a repre- sentative theory:
Keywords Epistemology  Intentionality  Perception  Temporality  Husserl
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DOI 10.1007/BF01279039
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