In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180 (2003)

Authors
Dan Zahavi
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed difference between the intending and the intended. As a consequence, Husserl never discovered the existence of pre-reflective self- awareness, but remained stuck in the traditional, but highly problematic reflection model of self-awareness
Keywords Consciousness  Self-awareness  Husserl
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Temporality and Psychopathology.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):75-104.
Being a body and having a body. The twofold temporality of embodied intentionality.Maren Wehrle - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):499-521.
The Time of the Self.Dan Zahavi - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):143-159.

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