The details of food-sharing interactions – their cost in social prestige

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):570-571 (2004)

Abstract

I agree with Gurven that costly signaling can explain food-sharing phenomena. However, costly signaling may also explain the role of food sharing in deterring rivals. Details of food-sharing interactions may reveal gains and losses in the social prestige of the interacting parties. The evolutionary models of kin selection and of reciprocal altruism are unstable and should be avoided.

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