Externalism, skepticism, and the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophical Review 114 (1):33-61 (2005)
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The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle.



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José L. Zalabardo
University College London

Citations of this work

When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
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How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
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References found in this work

Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
Reliabilism leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.

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